Role-based access control (RBAC) is useful in information security. It is a super set of discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC). Since DAC and MAC are useful in information flow control (which protects privacy within an application), RBAC can certainly be used in that control. Our research reveals that different control granularity is needed in different cases when controlling information flows within an application. An information flow control model should thus simultaneously offer different levels of control granularity. We designed a multipleleveled RBAC model to offer multiple levels of control granularity, in which a level of RBAC controls a level of granularity. We called the model L n RBAC (n-leveled RBAC), which offer the following features: (1) it allows different control granularity in different cases, (2) it solves the covert channel problems caused by abnormal program stopping, (3) it adapts to dynamic object state change, (4) it controls method invocation through argument sensitivity (5) it allows purpose-oriented method invocation, (6) it controls write access precisely, and (7) it avoids Trojan horses. We implemented a prototype for L n RBAC and evaluated it. This paper presents L n RBACL.
INTRODUCTION
Privacy protection within an application is essential for an application that manages sensitive data. The protection can be achieved by information flow control, which prevents information in high security levels from flowing to subjects in low security levels (i.e., the control block non-secure information flows). Many information flow control models have been developed, among which some applied mandatory access control (MAC) [Bell 1976 ] [Denning 1976 ] [Denning 1977 ], some applied discretionary access control (DAC) [Samarati 1997 ] [Ferrari 1997 ], some applied the label approach access his female friend "w1", "m1" can access both the general and personal information of "w1" by invoking the methods of "w1". With this control granularity, the control requirements mentioned above cannot be achieved. On the other hand, if the control granularity is detailed to methods only, we can only control the methods of a man/woman that can be invoked by a woman/man, but cannot control the variables that can be accessed by a method. In this regard, if a man's method "m1.md1" can invoke his female friend's method "w1.md1", both the general and personal information of "w1" can be offered to "m1" through "w1.md1". This control granularity, again, cannot achieve the control requirements mentioned above. According to the description above, detailing control granularity to variables is necessary. However, there are cases that coarser grained of control granularity are needed. For example, as described in the man/woman example, no information flow is allowed among strangers, whereas information flows among friends or between husband and wife are allowed. In this case, a control mechanism that details the control granularity to objects is needed to determine the legality of information flows among objects. As another example, a man can invoke methods of his female friends to handle information flows between friends. Moreover, he can invoke other methods of his wife to handle information flows between husband and wife. In other words, a woman's methods that can be invoked by her friends and those that can be invoked by her husband are generally different. In this case, a control mechanism that details the control granularity to methods should be available to determine the legality of method invocations (this feature is also called purpose-oriented method invocation in [Yasuda 1997]) .
In addition to the above cases of control granularity, an information flow control model should better offer a much coarser grained of control granularity to solve the covert channel problems [Focardi 1997 ] induced by abnormal program stopping. We explain this case below. When a program is abnormally stopped, the operating system will dump the memory space used by the program to a file. The debugger then helps programmer to debug the program using the dumped file. If the dumped file is accessed by an unauthorized user or application, private information within the program may be leaked. To prevent this, a model should control the human beings or applications that can access a file or run a program. In this regard, a control granularity details to just programs or files is needed.
As a summary, four types of control granularity should be simultaneously offered by an information flow control model. In the past years, we developed an RBAC-based information flow control model called OORBAC [Chou in press] . OORBAC details the control granularity to variables. Moreover, it incorporates complex mechanisms to detail control granularity to objects and methods. According to the experiences of using OORBAC, the control in OORBAC is too complicated. Moreover, OORBAC fails to solve the problems induced by covert channels. We thus revised OORBAC. The basic consideration of this revision is using multiple-leveled RBACs, in which one level of RBAC offers one level of control granularity. An information flow should fulfill every level of RBAC for the flow to be secure. Currently, the revised model is composed of the following four levels of RBAC. as the man's general information as an argument in the invocation should be denied. The rationale is that different variables carry different information and therefore should be used for different purposes. This feature is achieved by L3RBAC. 6. It controls write access precisely.
According to our survey, most existing models paid poor attention to write access control. They merely obeyed the "no write down" rule [Bell 1976 ] to control write access. Nevertheless, write access is destructive and therefore should be controlled precisely. Otherwise, data corruption may occur according to intentional or accidental mistakes. We propose that only the data sources trusted by a variable can write the variable. This feature is achieved by L3RBAC. 7. It avoids Trojan horses.
Avoiding Trojan horses [Myers 1998 ] [Myers 2000 ] is the basic feature that should be offered by every information flow control model. This feature is achieved by the join operation [Myers 1998 ] [Myers 2000 ]. This paper presents L n RBAC. Since every level RBAC of L n RBAC is an adaptation of RBAC96, we introduce RBAC96 briefly before describing L n RBAC. We also describe the features of L n RBAC. 
RBAC96
This section briefly introduces RBAC96. Details of it can be found in [Sandhu 1996a ]. Figure 1 shows RBAC96, which is composed of the following components:
a) A set of permissions (P). A permission approves a mode of access on an object. b) A set of roles (R). A role is composed of a set of permissions. c) A many-to-many permission to role assignment (PA). A permission may be assigned to multiple roles and a role may be assigned multiple permissions. d) A partially ordered role hierarchy (RH). Roles are structured using the " ≥ " relationship. If a relationship "x ≥ y" exists, "x" possesses all the permissions of "y". e) A set of users (U), which is a human being or an agent. Users play roles. A user playing a role possesses the permissions of the role. f) A set of sessions (S). A user establishes a session during which he plays one or more roles. g) A many-to-many user to role assignment (UA). A user may play many roles within a session, and may establish multiple sessions simultaneously. Moreover, multiple users may play the same role. In addition, users can change role to facilitate providing no extra privileges in a session [Sandhu 1996a ]. h) A function that maps a session to a single user (SU). Using the function, users in a session can be identified. i) A function that maps a session to a set of roles (SR). Using this function, the permissions of a session can be identified. j) A collection of constraints limiting the model elements.
L n RBAC
The most challenge work in designing L n RBAC is adapting to dynamic object state change (remember that an object state is a snapshot of objects and object relationships at a time point). We use the man/woman example mentioned in section 1 and the object states in Figure 2 to explain this. Figure 2 (a) depicts two men and two women. It also shows a marriage relationship among the man "m1", the woman "w1", and the certificate "cer1", and shows three friendship relationships between men and women. Figure 2 (b) depicts one newly added man "m3" and one newly added woman "w4". It also shows that "m1" and "w1" get divorced and then become strangers (in this case, the certificate "cer1" should be deleted). Moreover, the figure shows various marriage and friendship relationships between men and women. Figure 2 (c) shows that "w3" is past away. Since "m2" does not marry another woman, the marriage between "m2" and "w3" is still legal and therefore the certificate of the marriage, "cer3", need not be deleted. In the object state shown in Figure 2 (a), information flows among "m1", "w1" and "cer1" should obey the rules for a marriage because a "married" relationship exists among them. In addition, information flows between "m1" and "w2", those between "m2" and "w2", and those between "m2" and "w3" should obey the rules for friends because a "friends" relationship exists between the pairs of man and woman. Moreover, information flows between "m2" and "w1" are disallowed because they are strangers (i.e., no relationship exists between them). The allowed and disallowed information flows in Figures 2(b) and 2(c) will be different from those in Figure 2 (a) because of different object states. As a summary of the above description, the allowed and disallowed information will change according to object state change. Our research reveals that objects relationships [Rumbaugh 1999 ] can be used to determine whether an information flow is secure or not. We thus use them to regulate information flows among objects. We call a relationship an association, and give the following definition: Figure 2 (a)), "m1", "w1", and "cer1" coexist in an AG according to the association "married". Direct information flows are allowed among objects coexisting in an AG but disallowed among objects not coexisting in an AG. Since information cannot directly flow among sessions, an AG should be established for objects that may communicate. Although information cannot directly flow among sessions, it may indirectly flow among AGs. For example, if "obj1" and "obj2" are in an AG and "obj2" and "obj3" in another, information from "obj1" may indirectly flow to "obj3" via "obj2".
L n RBAC model
This section defines the four level RBACs in L n RBAC, in which only L0RBAC does not use the concept of association. L0RBAC regulates the access rights from human beings or programs to programs or files. It is defined below: S0, P0, R0, RH0, PA0, UA0, SU0, SR0) , in which "U0" is the set of users; "S0" is the set of sessions; "P0" is the set of permissions; "R0" is the set of roles; "RH0" is the set of role hierarchies; "PA0" is the set of permission to role assignment; "UA0" is the set of user to role assignment; "SU0" is the set of functions that map a session to users, and "SR0" is the set of functions that map a session to roles. The definition of L0RBAC's components are shown below:
U0 = {u | u is a human being or a program} S0 = {s | s is a time period during which a person runs a program or a program accesses a file} P0 = {(u, o, a) | u∈U0, o is a program or a file, a∈{r, w, e}, and u is allowed to access o in which the allowed access is indicated by a}.
P0 defines the access rights from users to programs or files, in which an access may be a read, a write, or an execute.
R0 = {r | r is a set of permissions} RH0 = {r0 ≥ r1 | r0, r1∈R0 and r0 possesses all permissions of r1} PA0 = {(r, p) | r∈R0 and p∈P0 and p is assigned to r} UA0 = {(u, r) | u∈U0 and r∈R0 and u is assigned to r} SU0 = {f | f is a function, f(s) = U in which s∈S0 and U ⊆ U0, and every user u in U is in the session s} SR0 = {f | f is a function, f(s) = R in which s∈S0 and R ⊆ R0, and every role r in R is within the session s}
L1RBAC determines whether information flows between two objects are allowed. It is defined below:
), in which "C" is the set of classes in an application and "A1" is the set of associations in the application. Remember that an association can be instantiated to produce AGs for objects to coexist. The component "A1" is defined below: A1 = (U1, S1, P1, R1, RH1, PA1, UA1, SU1, SR1, CT1), in which "U1", "S1", "P1", "R1", "RH1", "PA1", "UA1", "SU1", "SR1" are similar to "U0", "S0", "P0", "R0", "RH0", "PA0", "UA0", "SU0", "SR0" in L0RBAC.
Moreover, "CT1" is the constraints of L1RBAC. Components in "A1" are defined below: 
(r, p) | r∈R1 and p∈P1 and p is assigned to r} UA1 = {(u, r) | u∈U1 and r∈R1 and u is assigned to r} SU1 = {f | f is a function, f(s) = U in which s∈S1 and U ⊆ U1, and every user u in U is in the session s} SR1 = {f | f is a function, f(s) = R in which s∈S1 and R ⊆ R1, and every role r in R is within the session s} CT1 = {ct | ct is a cardinality constraint or a modality constraint}
From the above description, security policies of L1RBAC are embedded within associations. Note that L1RBAC also defines cardinality and modality constraints among classes [Pressman 2001 ]. L2RBAC determines whether an invocation between two methods is allowed. It is defined below: L2RBAC = (C, A2), in which "C" is the set of classes and "A2" is the set of associations. The component "A2" is defined below: S2, P2, R2, RH2, PA2, UA2, SU2, SR2) , in which "U2", "S2", "P2", "R2", "RH2", "PA2", "UA2", "SU2", "SR2" are similar to "U0", "S0", "P0", "R0", "RH0", "PA0", "UA0", "SU0", "SR0" in L0RBAC.
Components in "A2" are defined below: 
SR2 = {f | f is a function, f(s) = R in which s∈S2 and R ⊆ R2, and every role r in R is within the session s}
L3RBAC determines whether an information flow is secure. It is defined below: L3RBAC = (C, A3), in which "C" is the set of classes and "A3" is the set of associations. The component "A3" is defined below: S3, P3, R3, RH3, PA3, UA3, SU3, SR3, DSOURCE) , in which "U3", "S3", "P3", "R3", "RH3", "PA3", "UA3", "SU3", "SR3" are similar to "U0", "S0", "P0", "R0", "RH0", "PA0", "UA0", "SU0", "SR0" in L0RBAC. As to DSOURCE, it records the data source of a variable. For example, suppose the attribute "attName" is derived from the variable "var1" and "var2", and "var1" and "var2" are respectively written by the methods "mdx" and "mdy". Then, the DSOURCE of "attName" is the set "{mdx, mdy}" after the derivation. A DSOURCE is set empty initially. It will obtain contents during program execution through the join operation (see section 3.3). DSOURCEs facilitate controlling write access (see section 3.3). Components in "A3" are defined below:
RACL, WACL) | v is a variable, RACL = {m | m is a method that is allowed to read v}, and WACL = {m | m is a method that is allowed to write v}} R3 = {r | r is a set of permissions} RH3 = {r0 ≥ r1 | r0, r1∈R3 and r0 possesses all permissions of r1} PA3 = {(r, p) | r∈R3 and p∈P3 and p is assigned to r} UA3 = {(u, r) | u∈U3 and r∈R3 and u is assigned to r} SU3 = SU1 SR3 = {f | f is a function, f(s) = R in which s∈S3 and R ⊆ R3, and every role r in R is within the session s} DSOURCE = {f | f is a function, f(v) = {m | m is a method and m is a data source of v}, and v is a variable}
We embedded L n RBAC in the JAVA language to produce the L n RBACL language. APPENDIX 1 shows the man/woman example mentioned in section 1 implemented in L n RBACL. The object states shown in Figure 2 are implemented in the appendix. In the implementation, we suppose that the class "example", which contains the method "main", and the method "example.main" possesses every permission we needed because the class "example" is not the focus of this example.
The appendix shows that an L n RBACL program is composed of two parts, namely the RBAC part and the original JAVA program. Moreover, the RBAC part consists of L0RBAC through L3RBAC, and two non-JAVA statements are used in the JAVA program to define object states. They are "addAG" (line 15.4.4) to create an AG and "removeAG" (line 15.4.21) to remove an AG. L0RBAC defines the permissions of three roles. The role "operator" is allowed to execute the program "a.exe" and "debugger.exe". The role "program" is allowed to read the file "file1.dat" and write "file2.dat". The role "debugger" is allowed to read "dump.core". Here we suppose that the program in the appendix will be compiled into "a.exe", the debugger is "debugger.exe", and the operating system dumps the memory space used by "a.exe" to "dump.core" when "a.exe" is abnormally stopped. According to L0RBAC, only the debugger can access the dumped memory and only an operator can execute the debugger, this prevents the dumped file from being accessed by unauthorized persons or applications.
L1RBAC in APPENDIX 1 will be enacted when "a.exe" is executed (i.e., when L0RBAC initiates the session of executing "a.exe"). This level RBAC declares that man objects can access woman objects and vice versa under an AG according to the association "friends". It also declares that man (woman) objects can access woman (man) objects and certificate objects under an AG according to the association "married". Information flows among objects of the classes not appear in L1RBAC is not allowed. L1RBAC also declares the cardinality and modality constraint of an association. For example, line 3.1.1 indicates that a man can have multiple female friends (i.e., the cardinality is "*") and a man need not have a female friend (i.e., the modality is "O"). As another example, line 3.3.3.1 indicates that a marriage should exist for a certificate (i.e., the modality is "M") and one certificate can be associated with only one marriage (i.e., the cardinality is "1").
L2RBAC in APPENDIX 1 will be enacted when L0RBAC initiates the session of executing "a.exe". This level RBAC declares the allowed method invocations. For example, line 5.3.2.2 declares that the method "m1.change_others_general_infor" can invoke the method "w1.change_self_general_info" within an AG according to the association "married". Here "m1" is a man and "w1" is a woman. The role hierarchy in line 5.3.1 says that a permission possessed by the association "friends" is also possessed by the association "married". L3RBAC in APPENDIX 1 will be enacted when L0RBAC initiates the session of executing "a.exe". A permissions in this level RBAC declares the object methods that can read and write a variable. The permission related to a variable is an ACL of the variable, which composed of a RACL (read access control list) and a WACL (write access control list). See line 7.1.1.1 for an example, which defines the ACL of the variable "man.self_general_info" in the association "friends". RACLs, WACLs, and DSOURCEs ensure secure information flows.
Information flow security in L n RBAC
When executing an application, the operating system checks the information in L0RBAC to ensure that the execution is legal. During the execution of an application, the corresponding L1RBAC, L2RBAC, and L3RBAC are created. To check the security of an information flow, we first check the type of information flow. If the flow is induced by method invocation, L1RBAC down to L3RBAC should be involved to check the flow's security. If the flow is not induced by method invocation (i.e., the information flow is within a method), only L3RBAC is invoked in the checking. Below we describe the use of the three levels of RBAC.
1. If an information flow is induced by a method invocation, e.g., "obj1.md1" invokes "obj2.md2", L1RBAC is first involved to check whether information flows between "obj1" and "obj2" are allowed. If the answer is negative, the information flow is non-secure. 2. If the above answer is positive, L2RBAC is involved to check whether the invocation from "obj1.md1" to "obj2.md2" is allowed. If the answer is negative, the information flow is non-secure. 3. If an information flow is induced by method invocation and both the above checking passes, the ACLs and DSOURCEs of arguments should be copied to the corresponding parameters. The copying is secure because a parameter receiving the value of an argument inherits the security level of the argument. Note that if an object is passed as an argument, the copying is bypassed because ACLs and DSOURCEs of the object's variables are already defined. 4. After the above copying, every information flow in the invoked method should fulfill the following secure flow conditions. The conditions are established using ACLs in L3RBAC based on the following assumption: (a) a value derived from the variables "var1", "var2", "varn", and so on is assigned to the variable "d_var", (b) the assignment appears in the method "md1", (c) the original ACL of "d_var" is "{RACLd_var; WACLd_var}", (d) the ACL of the ith variable that derives "d_var" is "{RACLvari; WACLvari}", and (e) the DSOURCE of "vari" is "DSOURCEvari".
First secure flow condition: (RACL d_var
The first secure flow condition controls read access. The requirement "RACL d_var ⊆ (RACL var1 ∩ RACL var2 ∩ ... ∩ RACL varn )" requires that "d_var" must be the same restricted as or more restricted than "var1", "var2", "varn", and so on. The requirement "md1 ∈ (RACL var1 ∩ RACL var2 ∩ ... ∩ RACL varn )" is necessary because the variables "var1", "var2", "varn", and so on are read by the method "md1". The second secure flow condition controls write access. It requires that the data sources of "var1", "var2", "varn", and so on should be within "WACL d_var ", because the data derived from the variables are written to "d_var". The requirement also requires that the method "md1" must be within "WACL d_var " because the write operation is performed by the method. After the derived data is assigned to the variable "d_var", the ACL of "d_var" should be changed by the join operation [Myers 1998 ] [Myers 2000 ]. This change is to avoid Trojan horses. We use the symbol " ⊕ " to represent the join operator. With join, "ACL d_var " will be changed to be "ACL var1 ⊕ ACL var2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ACL varn " after the derived data is assigned to the variable "d_var". The join operation is defined below:
The join operation trusts less or the same readers. Therefore, join will not lower down security level. On the other hand, the operation trusts more writers. This is reasonable because a writer that can write a variable should be regarded as a trusted data source for the data derived from the variable. In addition to joining ACLs, the DSOURCE of "d_var" will be adjusted as follows:
"DSOURCE d_var " is set the union of "DSOURCE var1 ", "DSOURCE var2 ", "DSOURCE varn ", "{md1}", and so on. The union of the DSOURCEs is obvious because all data sources deriving the computation result should be considered data sources of the result. The method "md1" is also a data source because the computation result is written by "md1" to "d_var".
FEATURES
APPENDIX 1 to show that L n RBAC does offer the feature mentioned in section 1. Note that avoiding This section use the man/woman example mentioned in section 1 and the corresponding code in Trojan horse can be achieved by the join operation (see [Chou in press] ). Moreover, offering different control granularity in different cases is an implicit feature of L n RBAC.
Solve the covert channel problems caused by abnormal stopping of program
This feature is achieved by L0RBAC. In APPENDIX 1, L0RBAC declares that the dumped file can be accessed by the debugger only and the debugger can be executed by the operator only. With this, the operating system can prevent unauthorized persons and applications from accessing the dumped file. This solves the covert channel problems caused by abnormal program stopping. 
Allow purpose-oriented method invocation
This feature is achieved by L2RBAC. For example, line 5.3.2.2 in APPENDIX 1 shows that the method "change_others_general_info" of a man can invoke the method "change_self_general_info" of a woman if the man and the woman are within an AG according to the association "married".
Control method invocation through argument sensitivity
This feature is achieved by L3RBAC. We use an example to explain this. As described in section 1, a man "m1" can change the general information of his wife "w1". This change is accomplished by the method "m1.change_others_general_information" (line 9.8), which invokes the method "w1.change_self_general_info" (line 11.10) using the attribute "m1.others_new_generl_info" (line 9.8.2) as an argument. According to the ACLs in lines 7.3.1.3 and 7.3.3.1, both secure flow conditions are true in the above invocation (remember that DSOURCEs are initially empty). Therefore, the information flow induced by the above invocation is secure. Suppose another attribute of "m1", such as "m1.self_general_info" is used in that invocation, the information flow induced by the invocation will be non-secure. Let's trace the invocation below: When "m1.change_others_general_information" (line 9.8) invokes the method "w1.change_self_general_info" (line 11.10) using the attribute "m1.self_generl_info" as an argument, the ACL of the argument, which is "{m1.get_self_general_info, w1.get_others_general_info, m1.change_self_general_info; m1.change_self_general_info, w1.change_others_general_info}" (line 7.3.1.1), is copied to the parameter "new_general_info" of the method "w1.change_self_general_info". When executing the statement "self_general_info = new_general_info;" (line 11.10.1) within the method, the above ACL is compared with the ACL of "w1.self_general_info", which is "{w1.get_self_general_info, m1.get_others_general_info, w1.change_self_general_info; w1.change_self_general_info, m1.change_others_general_info}" (line 7.3.3.1). The comparison shows that the first secure flow condition is false and therefore the information is non-secure.
Control write access precisely
This feature is achieved by L3RBAC. We use an example to explain this. As described in section 1, a man "m1" can change the general information of his wife "w1". This change is accomplished by the method "m1.change_others_general_information" (line 9.8), which invokes the method "w1.change_self_general_info" (line 11.10). If the method "m1.get_others_general_info" (line 9.2)" tries to invoke the method "w1.change_self_general_info", the invocation will be blocked (i.e., the change is not allowed). The rationale is that the invocation fails to fulfill the second secure flow condition because the method "m1.get_others_general_info" is not within the WACL of the variable "w1.self_general_info" (line 7.3.3.1).
RELATED WORK
This section surveys related work according to the features mentioned in section 1. Covert channel problem is not discussed because we cannot identify a model that solves the problem.
The simplest information flow control approach is DAC. Since DAC fails to avoid Trojan horses, MAC [Bell 1976 ] [Denning 1976 ] [Denning 1977 ] was proposed. An important milestone of MAC is the model proposed by Bell&LaPadula [Bell 1976 ], which categorizes the security levels of objects and subjects. Information flows in the model follow the "no read up" and "no write down" rules [Bell 1976 ]. Bell&LaPadula's model was generalized into the lattice model [Denning 1976 ] [Denning 1977 ] (see [Sandhu 1993 ] for a survey of lattice models). In the typical lattice model proposed in [Denning 1976 ] [Denning 1977 ], a lattice (SC, → , ⊕ ) is constructed using "SC", which is the set of security classes, the symbol " → ", which is the "can flow" relationship, and the symbol " ⊕ ", which is the join operator. The "can flow" relationship controls information flows and the join operator avoids Trojan horses. Relationships between the features mentioned in section 1 and MAC are described below. First, MAC cannot detail the control granularity to different levels in different cases. The control granularity is decided by nodes in the lattice. For example, if nodes in the lattice are variables, the control granularity is detailed to variables. Second, MAC cannot adapt to dynamic object state change because the lattice in a MAC is fixed during program execution. Therefore, object state change should be predicted before program execution. Third, purposeoriented method invocation can be achieved if nodes in the lattice are object methods. Nevertheless, the control granularity will only be detailed to methods in this case. Fourth, controlling method invocation through argument sensitivity was not considered in the MACs we surveyed. Fifth, MAC failed to offer the feature of allowing only trusted sources to write a variable. The rationale is that MAC follows the "no write down" principle to control write access, with which the information in a node can be written to another node if the security level of the former is the same or lower than the latter. The model in [Samarati 1997 ] uses access control lists (ACLs) of objects to compute ACLs of executions (which are composed of one or more methods). A message filter is used to filter out possibly non-secure information flows. Interactions among executions are categorized into five modes. Different modes result in different security policies, which loosens the restriction of MAC. More flexibility is added by allowing exceptions during or after method execution [Ferrari 1997] . Relationships between the features mentioned in section 1 and the model in [Samarati 1997 ] are described below. First, it cannot detail the control granularity to different levels in different cases. In fact, it details the control granularity to objects only because ACLs are established among objects. Second, the model cannot adapt to dynamic object state change. The rationale is that ACLs are established among existing objects and therefore ACLs cannot be changed according to newly added objects during runtime. Third, purpose-oriented method invocation cannot be achieved because the control granularity details to objects only. Fourth, controlling method invocation through argument sensitivity and allowing only trusted sources to write a variable were not considered.
The purpose-oriented model [Yasuda 1997] proposes that invoking a method may be allowed for some methods but disallowed for others, even when the invokers belong to the same object. Relationships between the features mentioned in section 1 and the purpose-oriented model are described below. First, it cannot detail the control granularity to different levels in different cases. In fact, it details the control granularity to methods only. Second, the model cannot adapt to dynamic object state change. The rationale is that the model uses existing objects to create a flow graph, from which non-secure information flows can be identified. The flow graph is thus fixed during program execution. Third, purpose-oriented method invocation can be achieved. Fourth, controlling method invocation through argument sensitivity and allowing only trusted sources to write a variable were not considered.
The decentralized label approach [Myers 1998 ] [Myers 2000 ] marks the security levels of variables using labels. A label is composed of one or more policies, which should be simultaneously obeyed. A policy in a label is composed of an owner and zero or more readers that are allowed to read the data. Both owners and readers are principals, which may be users, group of users, and so on. Principals are grouped into hierarchies using the act-for relationships. A principal possesses all access rights of the principals it acts for. Join operation is used to avoid Trojan horses. Write access is controlled [Myers 2000]. Relationships between the features mentioned in section 1 and the decentralized label model are described below. First, it cannot detail the control granularity to different levels in different cases. In fact, it details the control granularity to variables because labels are attached to variables. Second, the model cannot adapt to dynamic object state change. The rationale is that, although principle hierarchies can be dynamically changed, principals seem fixed during runtime, which causes trouble when new objects are instantiated. Third, purpose-oriented method invocation was not considered. Fourth, controlling method invocation through argument sensitivity can be achieved but the author did not mention this. Fifth, the model controls write access more precise than other models [Myers 2000 ]. The approach in [McIlroy 1992 ] proposed a labeling system in UNIX. Every file, device, pipe, and process is attached with a label. Join operation is used to avoid Trojan horses. The approach also provides ceilings, which disallows processes to get into too sensitive locations. This avoids possible information leakage by the processes. The approach controls information flows among files, devices, and pipes. As to those among program variables, it does not control. Relationships between the features mentioned in section 1 and the model in [McIlroy 1992 ] are described below. First, it cannot detail the control granularity to different levels in different cases. In fact, it details the control granularity to objects only. Second, the model does not offer the features of adapting to dynamic object state change, purpose-oriented method invocation, controlling method invocation through argument sensitivity, and allowing only trusted sources to write a variable.
RBAC can also be used to control information flows. RBAC defines the roles a user can play. Users playing a role are generally human beings or intelligent agents [Sandhu 1996a] . A role is a collection of permissions [Sandhu 1996b ]. When a user instantiates a session and plays a role in the session, the user possesses the permissions of the role. Permissions are revoked from the user when the user does not play the role or the session ends. A user can play multiple roles [Sandhu 1996a ] and even change role during a session [Sandhu 1996b ]. Inheritance and other relationships can be established among roles to structure them [Tari 1997 ] [Sandhu 1996b ]. Moreover, constraints, such as two specific roles should be mutually exclusive, can be attached to roles [Ferraiolo 2001 ] [Giuri 1996 ] [Nyanchama 1999] . Relationships between the features mentioned in section 1 and RBAC are described below. First, it cannot detail the control granularity to different levels in different cases. In fact, it details the control granularity to only one level. Second, the model cannot adapt to dynamic object state change. The rationale is that users are the subjects that create sessions [Sandhu 1996b ] and therefore users and sessions cannot be automatically managed by an application (i.e., the management of users and sessions cannot be programmed). Third, purpose-oriented method invocation can be achieved if permissions are defined as the legality of method invocation. Nevertheless, since the original design of RBAC regards users as human beings or agents [Sandhu 1996a ], we cannot say that RBAC allows purpose orientation. Fourth, the features of controlling method invocation through argument sensitivity and allowing only trusted sources to write a variable are not offered. The model in [Izaki 2001 ] uses RBAC to control information flows. It classifies object methods and derives a flow graph from method invocations. From the graph, nonsecure information flows can be identified. Relationships between the features mentioned in section 1 and the model in [Izaki 2001 ] are described below. First, it cannot detail the control granularity to different levels in different cases. In fact, it details the control granularity to methods only. Second, the model cannot adapt to dynamic object state change because it uses predictable objects and methods to construct the flow graph. The flow graph thus cannot be changed during runtime. Third, purpose-oriented method invocation can be achieved because users in the model can be object methods. Fourth, the features of controlling method invocation through argument sensitivity and allowing only trusted sources to write a variable are not offered.
CONCLUSIONS
Role-based access control (RBAC) can be applied to control information flows (to protect privacy) within an application. The rationale is that RBAC is a super set of discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC), which are useful in information flow control. Our research reveals that different control granularity is needed in different cases when controlling information flows. Currently we identify four levels of control granularity that should be offered simultaneously by an information flow control model, including the granularity that details to programs and files, that details to objects, that details to objects methods, and that details to variables. In the past years, we developed an RBAC-based information flow control model called OORBAC (objectoriented RBAC). It simultaneously details control granularity to the latter three levels. Nevertheless, the control mechanism in OORBAC is complicated. We thus revised OORBAC using the multiple-leveled RBAC approach, in which one level of RBAC offers one level of control granularity. We called the revised model L n RBAC (n-leveled RBAC). Currently, L n RBAC is composed of four levels. The first level (L0RBAC) controls the access rights from human beings or programs to programs or files. This level RBAC solves the covert channel problems induced by abnormal program stopping. The second level (L1RBAC) regulates the allowed and disallowed information flows among objects. The third level (L2RBAC) controls the legality of method invocations. And, the fourth level (L3RBAC) controls information flows among variables. L n RBAC offers the following features:
It allows different control granularity in different cases
This feature is a consequence of multiple-leveled RBAC, in which different level RBAC controls different granularity. 2. It solves the covert channel problems caused by abnormal program stopping This feature is achieved by L0RBAC. In that level, users are human beings or programs, and permissions are access rights from human beings or programs to
